

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CHINESE AND WESTERN GRAND STRATEGIES IN GLOBAL POWER POLITICS

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ABSTRACT

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative are two major global development strategies, with the former being associated with China and the latter led by the United States and Western partners. Both aim to uplift millions out of poverty and enhance infrastructure development worldwide. This research article provides an overview of both initiatives, drawing on secondary data from various sources such as journal articles, websites, and reports. The study suggests that the BRI, particularly its transportation corridors, could accelerate economic growth and poverty reduction in many developing nations. However, for these benefits to materialize, significant policy reforms are necessary, including measures to enhance transparency, ensure debt sustainability, and address environmental, social, and corruption risks. The research aims to assist policymakers in developing countries by offering independent, empirical analysis to help them assess the potential benefits and challenges of participating in BRI projects. It evaluates proposed transportation projects across more than 70 countries connected by BRI corridors spanning Asia, Europe, and Africa. Additionally, the study provides a set of policy recommendations aimed at helping developing countries in these corridors maximize the advantages of BRI involvement while minimizing potential risks.

KEYWORDS

B3W, BRI, cold war, geopolitics, infrastructure, etc

List of Acronyms

BRI: Belt and Road Initiative

B3W: Build Back Better World.

INTRODUCTION

To contend with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Build Back Better World (B3W) faces several significant obstacles. Firstly, not all US allies fully support B3W; while the UK stands with the US, the EU and Germany, considering China as a crucial economic partner, present challenges. Secondly, B3W's funding primarily relies on private sector investments, aiming for returns from infrastructure projects. Thirdly, Italy's participation in both the G7 and BRI complicates broad support for B3W. China's substantial foreign exchange reserves, approximately \$3.2 trillion, are directed towards BRI projects for higher yields rather than low-yielding US Treasury bonds, a situation not shared by G7 nations. Fourthly, China holds a comparative advantage over G7 countries in physical infrastructure construction, boasting superior skills in infrastructure development, project management, and cost control. Moreover, construction supplies and labor are more affordable in China. The country's infrastructure achievements, including the world's fastest train and longest sea bridge, underscore its prowess. Remarkably, China completed its National Trunk Highway System, nearly twice the length of the US Interstate Highway System, in just 29 years compared to the 36 years it took for the latter' (Rana, 2021). Global power politics is the only one way of balancing power, peace, harmony, and development in the world.

Research Problem

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) serves as a financial tool for China to establish economic and geopolitical influence across Eurasia. In contrast, the Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative, spearheaded by the G7, aims to counter the BRI and curtail Chinese influence in the global arena. This rivalry between the two development mechanisms is generating considerable tension in the developing world, where nations must navigate the competing presences of both China and the United States.

A: What would it be the process of balancing the two superpowers- China and America-from Chinese BRI and economic dominance and American presence?

B: How is it possible to settle the ongoing conflicts between these two superpowers-China and America?

Objective of the Study

The objective of the study is to explore the ways to balance and arrange the ongoing conflicts between the two superpower nations-China and America. It is to trace out the process of minimizing American presence and Chinese global dominance through BRI and economics control.

A: To trace out the process of balancing the two superpowers- China and America-from Chinese BRI and economic dominance and American presence.

B: To draw the possible ways to settle the ongoing conflicts between these two superpowers-China and America.

METHODOLOGY

This is a qualitative research article mostly relied on the secondary data sources from Journal, Websites, Reports,

and Magazines. It has critically analyzed the power politics of the superpower nation of Chinese and Western grand-strategies through the secondary data and other published resources of various journals, reports, as well as the government documents to explore the hidden facts for the further information for those who are in this field for research.

Significance of the Research

This research has got its own significance for the policy makers and the politicians in having the balanced form of the global power politics and to maintain permanent peace, harmony, and order in the world. The research helps to explore how power politics must be retained in the balanced form for the entire humanity.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

On June 12, 2021, the G7 nations, along with India, endorsed the "Build Back Better World" (B3W) initiative, a program proposed by the United States aimed at countering China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in infrastructure investment. This development underscores a global division reminiscent of past eras, notably the post-World War II era when the world was divided into spheres led by the United States and the Soviet Union, commonly referred to as the "cold war." Some observers view this as the onset of a new Cold War, delineating ex-colonial powers from ex-colonies, especially considering the digital divide and disparities in Covid-19 vaccine distribution. This paper aims to delve into the significant schism of the twenty-first century. Historically, the United States and its allies have dominated the internet's development and control, both in terms of hardware and software. However, China, initially a manufacturing hub for Western nations, has made significant strides in developing its own hardware and software, challenging the traditional dominance of Western powers.

This concept may raise concerns among US-led alliances, given that Chinese firms have faced restrictions in participating in significant telecommunications infrastructure projects in countries allied with the US, such as Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, India, and others, since August 2018. Leaked information regarding the 'Protect America Act,' the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 2008 suggests that these mechanisms are being utilized to influence private US and allied companies—including Microsoft, Skype, Hotmail, Facebook, Google, YouTube, Yahoo, Paltalk, AOL, Vodafone, Global Crossing (with Hutchison Asia Telecom Group as a major owner), Apple, Inter-route Communication Ltd, Alcatel, CenturyLink, Lumen Technologies, and others—to engage in surveillance activities on other nations (Gellman & Poitras, 2013; Greenwald, MacAskill, Ball, & Rushe, 2013; Ball, Harding, & Garside, 2013). According to these reports, companies located in the United States, Europe, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and various other locations are utilizing hardware, software, applications, cables, Wi-Fi, phones, mobile devices, and other technologies for espionage activities targeting other nations. Additionally, as per the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the primary overseer of internet operations based in California, the international internet is heavily influenced by the United States. In response to these concerns, Russia initiated the development of its own internet infrastructure in August 2018, citing national security implications, and extended invitations to all members of the BRICS countries to participate. Furthermore, President Trump issued directives for the removal of Chinese hardware and software from the internet infrastructure of the United States and its military allies. Similarly, under Prime Minister Modi, India took actions to address these issues, has ejected Chinese hardware and software. The internet is being binary divided or fashioned because of this (Khuman Cha, 2021). At the systemic level, China's considerable economic strength guarantees its dominance within its economic sphere of influence in the region. At the dyadic level, China stands as the region's largest economy, wielding significant negotiating power and boasting a vast domestic market. Moreover, it possesses a robust state-led economic apparatus capable of deploying capital, and on occasion, human capital and

technology, to neighboring countries. These dynamics, both at the dyadic and systemic levels, contribute to shaping and restructuring power relations in the region. Despite the evident economic motivations behind the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China's top leadership has not been transparent about its true intentions. Xi Jinping, China's paramount leader, has articulated a vision of "Asian matters governed by Asians" and promoted the concept of an "ASEAN Common Destiny." This rhetoric extends beyond mere economic aspirations to encompass a broader regional geostrategic dimension, reminiscent of an Asian equivalent to the "Monroe Doctrine," ultimately aiming at establishing a China-centric regional order (Yu, 2018). It is the one way of the power politics to strengthen in the global form.

When Chinese President Xi Jinping discusses the "Chinese dream," it represents more than mere aspirations comparable to the American middle-class dream. Instead, it symbolizes China's collective ambition to regain its historical position as a major global power and, at one time, the leading global power. The "Chinese dream" embodies a patriotic vision of China's resurgence. Unlike Deng Xiaoping's strategy of cautious diplomacy, characterized by "hiding one's strength and biding one's time," Xi Jinping's approach advocates for a more proactive role for China in global affairs. During the tenure of Xi's predecessor, Jiang Zemin, China pursued a foreign policy focused on integrating economically with the global system, seeking both benefits from and contributions to a stable global economy.

This approach involved China joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), which greatly accelerated its economic progress through globalization. Nevertheless, Xi Jinping's foreign policy diverges from that of his predecessors. It seeks to confront the current global financial system, create an alternative system spearheaded by China to tackle global financial flaws, and secure a more influential position in global political and economic structures (ibid.p.24).

President Joe Biden has characterized the relationship between the United States and China as a "long-term strategic competition," referring to it as "intense competition." Undoubtedly, the Biden administration views the B3W project as a crucial strategic maneuver in this ongoing rivalry with China. Growing concerns within the United States center around the potential for China to challenge and undermine American interests globally, especially as the Belt and Road Initiative advances. From the US perspective, the Belt and Road Initiative, as a core element of China's broader strategy, contributes to the perception of China as a "rising threat" (Blumenthal 2018; Rolland 2017). The administration of former US President Donald Trump initiated significant shifts in the country's China strategy in recent years, focusing more on competition between the two global powers, suggesting the beginning of a new era akin to the Cold War (Wu, 2020). Since assuming office in January 2021, the Biden administration has maintained a perspective on US-China relations primarily framed by the concept of great power competition. Prior to Biden's 100th day in office, David Dollar, a senior scholar at the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution, remarked that the Biden administration has largely continued Trump's approach to handling China (Dollar 2021). The relationship between China and the United States is undergoing a significant transformation characterized by a "paradigm shift" towards "great power competition," with the Belt and Road Initiative remaining a central focus of strategic rivalry between the two nations in the foreseeable future. The Trump administration, diverging from previous administrations dating back to Richard Nixon, instigated the most notable change in US-China relations by identifying China as the "primary strategic challenge" to US national security, surpassing even Russia in this regard. This shift marked a departure from the long-standing approach of "engagement and hedging" towards China, with the Trump administration adopting a more competitive stance, particularly evident in its first National Security Strategy (NSS) introduced in December 2017. The NSS outlined the United States' transition into a new era of "great power competition," portraying China as a "revisionist power" and "strategic competitor" (The White House

2017). The report focused extensively on China, mentioning the country more than 30 times, primarily with the aim of addressing the perceived "China threat." As Thomas Fingar highlighted, China was initially viewed as a relatively ordinary concern by US policymakers, possibly not even ranking among the top ten national security priorities. However, the current emphasis on addressing the challenges posed by China has become a central aspect of the US national security policy agenda (Fingar 2019). In addition to being identified as a primary concern, China is regarded as a multifaceted global strategic competitor by US authorities. It's essential to recognize that the US perception of the "China threat" is intricate, encompassing various dimensions such as economics, technology, security, diplomacy, and ideology. These aspects are interconnected and mutually influential. Certain US politicians and experts have expressed concerns regarding China's alleged employment of "sharp power" or "influence operations," which are seen as significant threats to the political systems and democratic values of countries, including the United States. There is apprehension that China, having achieved economic advancement, is now seeking a corresponding political ascendancy (Cardenal et al. 2017). Christopher Wray, the Director of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation, characterizes China as a comprehensive threat to the United States, affecting all aspects of society (Zhao, 2021). Mendez, A., & Alden, C. (2021) the swift evolution of China's expansive strategy, marked by significant economic and political ambitions, is exemplified by the globalization of its development strategy. Initially focused on infrastructure diplomacy linking its domestic western regions with Central Asia, it has since evolved into the expansive Belt and Road Initiative spanning multiple nations. China's national security and global influence stand to gain unexpectedly from its engagement with smaller nation-states like Panama, a crucial hub in the global commerce system. Through economic statecraft in Panama, China is bolstering its political influence in this distant region of the global South while enhancing its access to markets in Latin America and the Caribbean. China's grand strategy operates on two tracks, offering countries the choice between liberal internationalist cooperation or zero-sum competition. This assertive approach positions China at the forefront of a growing coalition in the global South, collectively challenging American hegemony. Central to this strategy is the cultivation of strong relationships with smaller governments, particularly semi-peripheral ones like Panama (<https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2019.1657413>).

RESULTS OF ECONOMIC STRATEGIES

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), initiated in 2013, aims to enhance "regional connectivity," "economic integration," and address the significant infrastructure funding gap faced by many developing nations, as stated by the Chinese government. According to the OECD, closing this global infrastructure gap will require an investment of US\$95 trillion between 2016 and 2030, equivalent to approximately US\$6.3 trillion annually. The BRI is among the largest infrastructure funding initiatives globally, involving infrastructure investments in nearly 70 countries. Since its inception, China has reportedly supported over 2,600 projects valued at US\$4.2 trillion. The initiative comprises two primary networks: the Silk Road Economic Belt, which includes land routes across Asia and Europe, and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, which involves sea routes, particularly port developments along the Indian Ocean. Additionally, it encompasses the construction of various infrastructure projects such as skyscrapers, airports, energy pipelines, as well as maritime and land corridors. Chinese President Xi Jinping, at the Belt and Road Forum in 2017, mentioned the inclusion of aviation and digital connectivity in the initiative. Furthermore, the project entails the establishment of 50 special economic zones, modeled after the successful Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (Adams, 2021). According to its definition, B3W is a global initiative led by major democracies aimed at addressing the over C\$50 trillion infrastructure deficit in the developing world through values-driven, high-standard, and transparent infrastructure collaboration. While the initiative is multilateral and welcomes contributions from all countries, the United States is driving its

efforts. Officials state that B3W presents a positive and alternative vision for the world, reflecting the values, standards, and business practices of the participating nations. The initiative plans to leverage private-sector resources with catalytic investments from various development finance institutions. Four key areas of focus include gender equity and equality, climate change, health and health security, and digital technologies. The Biden administration emphasizes B3W as a reflection of their values and standards, aiming to generate significant infrastructure investment for low- and middle-income countries in the coming years. However, details regarding budget and time for implementation remain undisclosed, leaving the actual execution of the plan uncertain (ibid).

DISCUSSION

The centerpiece of the B3W initiative is the global infrastructure plan spearheaded by the United States, with support from the G7 countries to fund infrastructure development in underdeveloped nations. The initiative aims to highlight that democracies can effectively collaborate to benefit people genuinely, contrasting it with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which it criticizes as serving China's self-interest and burdening recipient nations with debt. However, despite being in the early stages of development, there are significant concerns surrounding the B3W effort. Firstly, the strategy aims to provide around \$40 trillion in financing by 2035, but it's unclear how President Biden plans to garner bipartisan support domestically, especially given the reduced investment in US domestic infrastructure. Questions have been raised about the affordability of such spending, considering the record national debt, and concerns about potential inflation if the government opts to 'print money.' However, these concerns may be unfounded, as economic recovery from COVID-19 is expected to be slow, keeping inflationary pressures low. Additionally, the Biden administration, as a financially sovereign government, has the capacity to fund spending denominated in US dollars. Nonetheless, convincing domestic voters to support significant foreign spending in the current political climate presents a formidable challenge. Furthermore, while advocating for 'no strings attached,' the emphasis on democratic norms by the G7 suggests that the US may demand reforms if recipient countries violate Western standards. Past experiences indicate that structural changes could be imposed as a condition of financing. Moreover, skepticism of government efficacy and a strong reliance on the private sector may hinder trust and collaboration with public agencies in recipient countries. Lastly, the BRI has already initiated 2,600 infrastructure projects in underdeveloped nations, totaling approximately US\$3.7 trillion, posing competition to the B3W initiative.

The G7's infrastructure plan, conceived as an alternative to the BRI, may face challenges in cooperating with Chinese-led projects. This could lead to disjointed and disorganized efforts in global infrastructure development. While some argue that the G7 strategy could foster healthy competition with China, which could benefit the world, competition without proper teamwork and cooperation can be inefficient and detrimental. The G7 nations possess the resources and expertise to fund large-scale infrastructure projects, with examples such as Japan's involvement in infrastructure construction in Southeast Asia. B3W does not necessarily have to be positioned as a direct alternative to China's Belt and Road Initiative. There are opportunities for both initiatives to compete in some respects while complementing each other in others. For instance, countries like Japan and Italy are involved in both BRI and B3W, suggesting coordination rather than rivalry. Addressing global concerns such as infrastructure deficits and climate change requires a coordinated multinational response, which acknowledges differences, resolves conflicts, and fosters collaboration towards common goals. President Biden's adversarial stance towards China may not be conducive to mobilizing the necessary collaboration to tackle pressing global challenges. Repositioning B3W to lead towards a more sustainable future through a more inclusive approach could strengthen US leadership (Liang, 2021). Joanne Gowan and Edward D. Mansfield (1993) argue that the conventional explanation attributing the scarcity of open international markets to the

structure of state preferences in trade, often framed as a prisoner's dilemma, overlooks a crucial aspect of free trade agreements in an anarchic international system—namely, their security externalities. By explicitly considering these external effects, they draw two conclusions: (1) free trade is more likely within political-military alliances than across them, and (2) alliances are more likely to evolve into free-trade coalitions in bipolar systems compared to multipolar systems. Their hypotheses are supported by data spanning an 80-year period from 1905, which reveals a direct, statistically significant, and substantial impact of alliances on bilateral trade flows, particularly robust in bipolar systems. Similarly, Daniel W. Drezner notes that since the beginning of 2009, China has engaged in various policy confrontations with the United States. In terms of security, Chinese vessels have clashed with U.S. surveillance ships multiple times, hindering American efforts to gather naval intelligence. Additionally, China has voiced economic policy concerns to the United States, with Prime Minister Wen Jiabao expressing worry about China's significant investments in the U.S. and advocating for their protection. Zhou Sichuan, the head of the People's Bank of China, has proposed reducing reliance on the dollar as the global reserve currency in a white paper. Furthermore, the Chinese government has consistently pushed for an enhanced role in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, organizing a summit of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) leaders to amplify this message. Furthermore John J. Mearsheimer (2021) Explaining that three decades ago marked the end of the Cold War, with the United States emerging as the predominant global superpower, having triumphed over its adversaries. In the aftermath, concerns regarding China, once a weak and impoverished ally during the Cold War, began to surface as U.S. policymakers evaluated potential threats. Despite China's previous alignment with the United States against the Soviet Union for over a decade, certain unsettling indicators emerged: China's population size was nearly five times larger than that of the United States, and its leadership had embraced economic reforms. Given the pivotal role of population size and wealth in determining military power, there was a genuine apprehension that China could experience significant growth in the ensuing decades. Foreseeing the likelihood of a more formidable China challenging U.S. dominance in Asia and potentially on a global scale, it became evident to U.S. policymakers that hindering China's ascent was a strategic imperative.

American political power is based with Europe and in this sense Mlada Bukovansky (2002) has clarified that political culture not only influences the internal governance structure of individual states but also shapes the dynamics of their external relations. Whether a state adopts monarchical rule or democracy, the legitimacy of its political system extends beyond its borders. In a monarchy, the authority of the monarch is acknowledged not just domestically but also internationally. Among fellow monarchs, the ruler assumes multiple roles - ranging from an equal to a rival, a potential ally or adversary, and even a family member, such as a parent, sibling, cousin, aunt, uncle, niece, or nephew. The monarch's absolute authority and familial connections contribute to the perception of strength and viability in international relations. While concepts like absolute authority, honor, prestige, and dynastic ties serve as universal measures of power, the monarch's behavior and perception vary when interacting with the international "family" compared to interactions with subjects. Although domestic and international legitimacy may share foundations in the concept of political authority, the rules and norms derived from these legitimacy concepts exhibit differences in the international and domestic arenas. Consequently, comprehending the empirical connections between international and domestic legitimacy becomes crucial.

Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall have highlighted the central role of the concept of power in discussions within the field of international relations. However, they argue that current discussions often focus solely on one aspect: the ability of one actor to control the actions of another, compelling them to behave in ways they might not otherwise choose. This narrow conceptualization not only overlooks the various manifestations of power in international politics but also impedes the development of nuanced insights into how global outcomes are

shaped and how actors are empowered or constrained in determining their destinies. The authors advocate for scholars in international relations to embrace multiple conceptions of power and develop a conceptual framework that facilitates a thorough examination of power in its diverse forms. They propose a taxonomy of power, defining it as the generation, through social relations, of effects that influence the abilities of actors to shape their circumstances and futures. This comprehensive concept encompasses two key analytical dimensions: the types of social relations through which power operates (interactive or constitutive) and the specificity of social relations determining the generation of effects (specific/direct or diffuse/indirect). Based on these distinctions, they outline four power concepts: compulsory, institutional, structural, and productive. The authors then illustrate the importance of considering multiple forms of power in analyzing global governance and the role of the American empire. They conclude by advocating for scholars to recognize the interconnectedness of these concepts rather than viewing them as competing, which would foster more robust understandings of how power operates in international politics.

Janice Bially Mattern has highlighted the conflicting interests between the United States and Britain, asserting that the crisis in the Special Relationship primarily arose from conflicting material interests. The United States perceived the Suez Crisis as a critical arena for Cold War politics, viewing the use of force to reclaim the canal from Egypt as undermining the West's moral standing, particularly during the Soviet repression in Hungary. In contrast, the British were more concerned about Nasser's dictatorial politics posing a threat to their unrestricted oil supply. While previous conflicts over Middle East policy between the two nations had been mere disagreements, the Suez incident escalated into a crisis due to the absence of a shared Anglo-American interpretative framework to understand and respond to Nasser's nationalization. The legal nature of Nasser's actions led the United States to oppose the use of force, contrasting with the British perspective that prioritized post-imperialist prestige over sovereignty, self-determination, and legal rights. The British perceived the American reluctance to use force as granting credibility to a dictator, indicating a divergence in the commitment to freedom. The Suez nationalization revealed a fundamental divide in vision, values, and goals. A similar type of internal conflicting relationship is likely to persist between China and America. In this context, Yong Deng and Thomas G. Moore have argued that China is experiencing a rise in the era of globalization. Initially driven by economic necessity during the reform era, China has increasingly embraced interdependence and globalization with growing enthusiasm. However, Chinese political leaders recognize the dual nature of economic globalization for China. While it facilitates national economic growth, mishandling this transformative force could derail China's pursuit of great-power status. Economic globalization introduces new vulnerabilities, and the emergence of nontraditional threats like terrorism and infectious diseases poses serious challenges to China's global security. Consequently, Beijing actively manages the globalization process by reshaping its approach to security through measures such as domestic banking reforms and proactive trade diplomacy to safeguard economic interests. The evolving perspectives of Chinese political elites on various issues through the lens of globalization indicate China's complex pursuit of development, security, and status over time.

According to a recent study by the World Bank Group on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) transportation corridors, while China's BRI could accelerate economic development and poverty reduction for many developing nations, it necessitates comprehensive policy reforms to address issues like transparency, debt sustainability, and risks related to the environment, social aspects, and corruption. The research, titled *Belt and Road Economics*, aims to aid policymakers in these countries by providing independent, data-driven analysis to evaluate the potential benefits and risks of participating in BRI projects. It assesses proposed transportation projects across more than 70 countries along land and sea corridors linking Asia, Europe, and Africa and includes policy recommendations to help developing countries in these corridors maximize benefits while minimizing

risks. However, the BRI also poses significant risks, exacerbated by a lack of transparency and weak institutions in participating economies, as highlighted in the report. Cooperation among all economies within a corridor is crucial given the transnational nature of many BRI projects. Furthermore, specific data indicates that twelve of the 43 corridor economies, most of which already have high debt levels, could face further challenges in debt sustainability soon. Additionally, the BRI has the potential to increase global carbon emissions by 0.3 percent overall, with a potential increase of up to 7% in countries with low emissions (Ruta, 2019). The intricate dynamics between China's Belt and Road Initiative and American involvement can have adverse effects on global conditions for all nations worldwide. Adhikari et al. (2022) have also argued that international power relations must be maintained mainly by the superpowers to balance peace and order in the world. In this sense, the power politics of China and the Western nations mainly of the USA must be in the balanced form for the establishment of permanent peace in the world. In the same way, Guragain and Adhikari (2024) have pleaded to have the international cooperation for the balancing of the ecology and environment and it is possible only through the balance of power politics.

CONCLUSION

The study seems to have found that on the BRI transportation corridors, China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) could speed up economic development and reduce poverty for dozens of developing countries, but it must be accompanied by deep policy reforms that increase transparency, improve debt sustainability, and mitigate environmental, social, and corruption risks. The Belt and Road Economics research seems to have found to have intended to assist policymakers in developing countries in weighing the possible benefits and dangers of participation in BRI projects through independent, empirical analysis. It has been found to have evaluated a network of proposed transportation projects in more than 70 nations along land and sea that BRI corridors that connect Asia, Europe, and Africa. It also has been found that BRI contains a set of policy recommendations to assist developing countries in such corridors in maximizing potential benefits while minimizing hazards. BRI, however, seems to have come with major dangers, which are worsened by a lack of openness and poor institutions in participating economies, according to the report analyzed in the discussion. Because many BRI projects span borders, it seems to have displayed that it is vital that all economies within a corridor work together. Twelve of the 43 corridor economies for which specific data is available—the majority of which already have high debt levels—could see their debt sustainability prospects deteriorate further in the foreseeable term. The BRI of Chinese project and American presence seems to have found creating face to face confrontation and direct conflicts between two superpowers which seems to have found detrimental for the entire global nations. The only one solution of such burning issue has been found to be addressed through diplomatic dialogues and the worthy process of handling both superpowers for the welfare of the global citizens. The American presence in the confrontation with Chinese BRI seems to have found to be addressed through the negotiation and balancing the conflicts and transforming the global unrest with peace and security. The anonymous and internal conflicts of these two superpowers-US-China- seems to have found to be disastrous as well as the feeling of insecurity and instability of global politics. The internal confrontation must be found to be expressed externally sooner or later. China seems to have to be establishing herself as a global power through economy and the road excess as it is found to be witnessed through BRI and global markets of supply of goods as the demand of the various nations in the world. Power-politics of China and America through the BRI and investment seems to have found endangering to the global peace and security.

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